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C
leantech is playing an increasingly important role as a 
sector of investment on the international scale, attract-
ing  $8.4  billion  in  the  North  American,  European, 
Chinese, and Indian markets in 2008.2 This represents a thirty-
eight percent increase on the $6.1 billion invested in cleantech 
in 2007 in the same markets.3 
Within cleantech, arguably the 
most important area, or sub-sec-
tor, of investment is renewable 
energy technologies and genera-
tion systems, which account for 
over thirty percent of cleantech 
investment  flows.4  However, 
the  role  of  renewable  energy 
technologies  at  the  national 
scale is also increasing in impor-
tance.  This  article  focuses  on 
China, where the development 
of renewable energy sources is 
crucial to energy security and 
to providing alternatives to the 
carbon economy, which is cur-
rently generating many environ-
mental externalities. Renewable 
energy technology development 
and manufacturing also provide 
clear opportunities for the Chi-
nese central government to promote a domestic technology man-
ufacturing base, and to achieve China’s 2020 energy generation 
targets, as will be shown below. Therefore, renewable energy 
technology will play an increasingly important role in China’s 
energy landscape. At the present time, renewable energy is both 
a current generation reality and a future technology opportu-
nity: by 2005, renewable energy provided eight percent of the 
country’s total energy consumption and sixteen percent of its 
total electricity output.5 This is expected to more than double 
by 2020.6
At the same time, research reveals that the Chinese renew-
able energy technology market presents a paradox: a market of 
opportunity based on a need for the development of generating 
capacity from renewable sources, coupled with the existence 
of policy, fiscal, and technological obstacles which hamper the 
potential of China’s cleantech market in renewable energies. 
China is depicted as a leading cleantech market in the short to 
medium term, especially in renewable energy technology, proj-
ect infrastructure, and manufacturing.
However, many researchers have also highlighted the prob-
lems which seemingly go hand in hand with China’s status as a 
predominant emergent renewables market in the short term, and 
as a projected market leader in the next five to ten years. These 
issues are not only restricted to the renewables business; they 
extend across the wider political and cultural context, bringing to 
light the importance of a network 
approach to renewable energy 
technology development, manu-
facturing,  and  deployment.  In 
short, China’s renewable energy 
market presents an opportunity 
with clear challenges. The fol-
lowing provides an analysis of 
the main obstacles facing and 
currently  affecting  the  renew-
able energy market in China.
obsTacles: polIcy, Tax, 
anD long-Term markeT 
DevelopmenT
Energy landscapes can be 
uneven  landscapes.  This  can 
be due to a variety of factors. 
However,  above  all,  the  exis-
tence of obstacles to the devel-
opment of cleantech landscapes 
in a national context can mostly be related to policy, fiscal, and 
economic issues which can be deeply local. At the same time, 
global economic influences—both at the firm level and at the 
level of international economic policies—intersect with national 
regulatory and technology landscapes to constitute a complex 
environment in which clean energy technologies develop. Chi-
na’s cleantech landscape, and specifically its renewable energy 
market, is an example of the interplay of these forces. The fol-
lowing highlights some of the main issues facing the renewable 
energy market in the country today, focusing on energy pricing 
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Changes in import duties 
need to be stable in 
order to truly promote 
technology transfer into 
China; fiscal policy 
stability aids foreign 
technology businesses’ 
long-range strategy  
and planning.7 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
policy, technology transfer, private investment, and the need 
for emphasis on energy conservation as well as monitoring and 
evaluation.
pricing policy ShortfallS
China’s 2006 Renewable Energy Law attempts, among 
other things, to set pricing standards for energy generated from 
renewable energy sources.7 The law’s broad aims are to increase 
the  capacity  generated  from 
renewables in the country, and 
are part of a wider national strat-
egy aimed at increasing power 
supply as well as diversifying 
the generating base, as a result 
of  rising  demand  and  a  need 
for energy security.8 The law’s 
renewable energy pricing mech-
anisms are based on “feed-in” 
tariff models of the kind applied 
to  European  energy  markets;9 
however, the link between pric-
ing at source and grid distribution in China is proving problem-
atic.10 This is largely because utility companies have, in many 
cases, little incentive to connect a renewable energy project, such 
as a wind farm, to the grid. Once such projects are connected, 
utilities are required to purchase power generated by the proj-
ects; the price for renewables-generated power is higher than for 
coal-generated power, generally due to government-mandated 
subsidies and tariff levels (which are aimed at generating proj-
ect revenue as well as paying off interest and loan principals 
required to build renewables projects in the first place).11 There-
fore, the current renewable energy landscape—especially in the 
case of wind power—features a backlog of completed projects 
which are not actually connected to the grid.12 
technology tranSfer: uncertainty over import 
tariffS 
Uncertainty also exists over the stability of China’s current 
import duties on renewable energy technology and associated 
machine components. This uncertainty is an especially important 
factor in hampering already established technologies like wind 
turbines. For example, ninety-seven percent of large-scale (non-
micro) wind turbines currently installed in China are imported 
(this includes components).13 The Chinese government’s import 
duty strategy for wind technology has varied widely since the 
dawn  of  large-scale  wind  generation  in  1986,  alternatively 
imposing high and virtually non-existent taxes (see Figure 1). 
For example, from 1990 to 1995, import duties were largely 
non-existent as the central government attempted to stimulate 
partnerships and technology transfer to develop a wind power 
base for the country.14 By 1996, the government’s strategic 
focus had shifted to the development of a domestic, national, 
and localized wind turbine manufacturing market. In order to 
stimulate domestic manufacturers, the government levied duties 
on foreign wind technology imports. The imposition of duties 
was reversed again in 1998, and 
a robust domestic manufactur-
ing market is indeed develop-
ing:  between  2003  and  2005, 
local  wind  turbine  production 
rose from $26 to $104 million.15 
However,  during  the  same 
period,  the  share  of  imported 
turbine  technology  rose  from 
$35.9 to $211.9 million.16 
Uncertainty  remains  over 
the instability of import duties 
and other taxes on foreign technology imports: for example, in 
April 2008, the central government changed the import context 
again by refunding value added tax (“VAT”) on imported tur-
bine components; this tax refund was backdated to the start of 
2008.17 While this specific measure is aimed at easing the cost of 
importing wind technology to China, it also inhibits the devel-
opment of domestic wind turbine manufacturing by providing 
incentives for importing essential components. Furthermore, 
changes in import duties need to be stable in order to truly pro-
mote technology transfer into China; fiscal policy stability aids 
foreign technology businesses’ long-range strategy and plan-
ning. For example, the VAT rebate measure was accompanied 
by the cancellation of China’s tariff-free policy for foreign tur-
bine units with a capacity of less than 2.5 megawatts (“MW”). 
Although this is in keeping with the central aim of building wind 
farms with a generating capacity of not less than 100 MW,18 the 
resulting shifting import duty and tax landscape is not conducive 
to transparent cost pricing for importers, domestic manufactur-
ers and, indeed, wind project developers.
private inveStment ShortfallS
At present, wind power technology and project develop-
ment in China could be improved by enabling more investment 
from private sources (see discussion of development needs 
above). Government subsidies and preferential loan systems 
exist, but uncertainty over power prices hinders the inflow of 
capital focused on renewable energy projects. In this respect, the 
Figure 1: Timeline of shifting import duties and taxes on foreign technology imports.
Uncertainty over power 
prices hinders the inflow 
of capital focused on 
renewable energy projects.8 sprIng 2009
Chinese renewable energy technology market is markedly dif-
ferent from other, more established renewables markets such as 
in European countries or the United States: 
[P]rivate investment has become the predominant force 
in wind farm construction in other countries. For exam-
ple, around ninety-five percent of investment in wind 
farms was contributed by the private sector in India . . . ;  
However, unless a new investment mechanism with 
incentive policies and regulations is established [in 
China], and more financial channels are opened up, it 
[will] be difficult to realize the target of wind energy 
development.19
a Decline in energy conServation inveStment 
From the point of view of sustainability discourse and policy, 
national and regional efforts to promote sustainability in China 
cannot be seen as separate from efforts to improve energy con-
servation capabilities. China is currently adding the equivalent 
of a 2,000 MW coal-fired power plant to its generating capacity 
every week, and has been doing so since around 2000.20 This 
represents a large annual rise in the amount of fossil-fuel gener-
ated power, and a resultant rise in environmental externalities. 
In 2004, for example, the amount of energy capacity added to 
China’s generation system was roughly equivalent to the amount 
of energy generated in the whole of Spain or California.21 At the 
same time generating capacity has increased on the mainland, 
there has been an increased focus 
on  renewable  energy  sources, 
especially hydroelectric, wind, 
and  lately,  solar  power.  How-
ever,  this  double  trend—large 
incremental rises in generation 
capacity based on fossil fuels, 
and a rising interest in renewable 
energy sources—has been paral-
leled by a decrease in investment 
in energy conservation projects. 
This has led to the paradoxical 
situation that, from 1980 to 2000, 
China benefited from an energy 
supply surplus; since 2000, even 
with the added capacity, China 
has  suffered  from  increasing 
energy shortages. Indeed, Jiang 
Lin, a China energy researcher at 
the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory in Berkeley, California, has recently argued that 
“support and policy commitments to energy conservation in 
China have weakened considerably during China’s transition to 
a more market-based economy.”22
monitoring, evaluation, anD uSer perSpectiveS
A wider issue, applicable across all renewable energy mar-
kets, is the need for consistent, transparent, and precise moni-
toring and evaluation of renewable energy projects after they 
have been commissioned and progressed past the project stage. 
In particular, recent research has pointed to the need to include 
user perspectives both in terms of the efficacy of new energy 
technologies, and their wider socio-cultural acceptability within 
particular contexts.23 The adoption of effective monitoring and 
evaluation (“M&E”) programs can in turn be seen as a solution 
to the lack of connections from renewables projects to the grid. 
This is because effective M&E programs can be constructed 
around a set of key indicators—
such as the number of projects 
connected to the grid, or a series 
of connections over a specific 
time span—which clearly track 
progress. However, underlying 
grid connection issues, such as 
electricity pricing and subsidies 
as well as incentives for utilities 
to  connect  renewable  genera-
tion capacity to the grid, have to 
be resolved before M&E can be 
effectively applied.
obsTacles or 
challenges?
These factors constitute a 
very real threat not to the devel-
opment of China’s renewable 
energy  landscape,  but  to  its 
progress. It would, in fact, be unrealistic to forecast a stalling of 
the Chinese renewables market, especially after the passing of 
the 2006 Renewable Energy Law and considering the number 
of projects still in the pipeline. Furthermore, the current proj-
ect pipeline may provide a temporal buffer—a year at most—
in terms of project development, which could help offset the 
negative effects of the current credit crisis and oil price declines 
on the renewable energy spectrum, from research and develop-
China features several 
leading solar power 
and photovoltaic 
manufacturing and project 
companies, active in the 
domestic as well as in  
the international  
cleantech field.  
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ment (“R&D”) expenditure to project development and grid 
connections.
The main risks posed by the obstacles identified above lie, 
instead, in the friction which could be exerted on the Chinese 
renewables technology market. This friction can be expressed in 
terms of slower growth in what is a dynamic and fast-developing 
market;  erratic  policy  inter-
ventions,  ineffective  pricing 
mechanisms, and other factors 
can be seen as draining the Chi-
nese market of potential energy 
just after the achievement of its 
take-off phase.24 If China is to 
achieve its 2020 target of fifteen 
percent of national energy gener-
ation from renewables,25 as laid 
out in its latest (2006-10) Five 
Year Plan, then these obstacles 
represent serious challenges to 
be faced before the end of the 
decade. This is especially rele-
vant in the case of those already 
established projects, apart from 
hydroelectric power, which are 
expected to lead the renewables 
generation tables: wind power, 
for example, is expected to account for three percent of national 
generation capacity by 2020.26 However, the identified obstacles 
should be considered challenges, not market conditions that will 
negatively affect the Chinese market in the long run. Indeed, 
apart from these obstacles, the Chinese renewable energy mar-
ket is exhibiting signs of vitality, innovation, and opportunity. 
This article concludes by focusing, briefly, on these avenues of 
future renewables development.
conclusIon: InnovaTIon anD opporTunITy
As argued above, the main obstacles facing the Chinese 
renewable energy market are challenges to be faced in the 
realms of policy, pricing, and technology development incen-
tives and subsidies. In terms of sustainability, China needs to be 
able to apply innovative policies to energy conservation and an 
amelioration of the lived environment, especially in urban areas. 
Landmark projects, such as those at Dongtan eco-city, mask the 
fact that conservation and emissions reductions are priorities 
which are secondary to continued growth. This focus on growth, 
in turn, leads to a continued focus on a carbon-fueled economy. 
However, there are some areas in which China’s renewables 
market is exhibiting clear signs of innovation and leadership, as 
opposed to reaction to market conditions.
One of these areas is renewable energy technology exports. 
China is traditionally described as a net importer of renewable 
energy technology, technical know-how, and project develop-
ment capabilities. This is especially the case where established 
technologies—developed mostly outside China—are concerned. 
In the case of wind power, mentioned above, China imports the 
great majority of its turbine technology as well as components.27 
However, by 2008, it had become an increasingly important 
exporter and manufacturer of other renewable energy generation 
technologies. Solar power is a case in point. China features sev-
eral leading solar power and photovoltaic (“PV”) manufacturing 
and project companies, active in the domestic as well as in the 
international cleantech fields. For 
example, Suntech Power Hold-
ings (“Suntech”), a leading solar 
power player, has been involved 
in co-developing and investing in 
several large overseas projects, 
such  as  Elecnor,  a  thirty-five 
MW solar power plant in Spain, 
and Alamosa solar plant in the 
U.S. state of Colorado, an eight 
MW  project.28  Furthermore, 
Chinese  solar  companies  have 
been engaged in opening up new 
markets  for  their  solar  exper-
tise, as seen in the construction 
of Katsrin solar power plant in 
the Golan Heights, Israel.29 The 
fifty kilowatt farm is the largest 
in the country to date, and was 
constructed by Israeli solar firm 
Solarit Doral, in conjunction with Suntech.30 It is where renew-
able energy technologies are currently in the take-off stage—
such as PV technologies—that Chinese renewables companies 
can be best positioned to compete and gain advantage over 
non-Chinese rival firms. Government investment in R&D must 
be rationalized and increased, however, if niche technology 
developments are to be effectively researched, marketed, and 
manufactured.31
Secondly, China’s focus on large-scale renewable energy 
generation projects provides a clear opportunity for the pooling 
of large-scale project expertise; this will be increasingly relevant 
internationally, as the focus on renewables shifts to projects with 
larger generating capacities. China’s aim of generating thirty 
gigawatts of installed wind power capacity by 2020, powering 
between thirteen and thirty million homes at full capacity, neces-
sitates  large-scale,  highly-organized  project  development.32 
By 2020, the Chinese renewable energy project landscape is 
increasingly going to feature large-scale projects, generating 
more than 1,000 MW in capacity per project, connected to the 
grid.33 The lion’s share of these projects’ generation capacity is 
likely to come from hydroelectric power and wind farms, with 
wind farms accounting for a majority of projects, at least in num-
ber.34 Furthermore, offshore wind farms featuring large-scale 
wind turbines are going to be an increasingly important feature 
of coastal renewable energy generation: in November 2006, 
China’s first offshore wind facility, with a capacity of 1.5 MW, 
was installed by China National Offshore Corporation using tur-
bines manufactured by Xinjiang Goldwind. By 2009, work was 
China’s cleantech  
market, especially 
in renewable energy 
generation technologies,  
is set to continue its  
take-off phase and  
gain altitude and 
international traction.10 sprIng 2009
underway on large-scale offshore wind farms, including the 102 
MW Shanghai East Ocean Offshore Wind Farm.35 
The points made in this article show that, in the case of 
renewable energy technologies within the Chinese cleantech 
market, China stands at a paradoxical waypoint. On the one 
hand, the Chinese context and market represent clear invest-
ment, development, and generation opportunities. On the other 
hand, the policy and fiscal obstacles identified in the article rep-
resent clear problems which will slow down development and 
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